Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution

	Trusting-Trust Attack against an Entire Linux Distribution(arxiv.org)
	238 points by signa11 5 days ago \| 58 comments
	tl;dr: Researchers demonstrate that Thompson's trusting-trust attack isn't limited to compilers by implementing it via GNU strip, a build utility that neither reads nor emits source code. Using a single tampered strip binary in the NixOS bootstrap seed, they propagate a backdoor across strip generations that persists after the seed exits the dependency closure, ultimately backdooring nearly every binary in a full graphical installer built from a real nixpkgs revision.
	HN Discussion: ↓Wheeler's diverse double-compiling counter-attack still applies and the paper dismisses it unconvincingly ↑Provides supplementary context on bootstrap seeds and encourages extending the work to other platforms ↓The attack is not novel — Thompson himself noted it applied beyond compilers, and it's essentially a known virus concept •Points to existing solutions like Guix full-source bootstrap or Orange Book traceability as mitigations ↓The finding is trivial — compromised build tools obviously compromise artifacts